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Abstract Noun phrases with overt determiners, such as some apples or a quantity
of milk, differ from bare noun phrases like apples or milk in their contribution to
aspectual composition. While this has been attributed to syntactic or algebraic
properties of these noun phrases, such accounts have explanatory shortcomings. We
suggest instead that the relevant property that distinguishes between the two classes
of noun phrases derives from two modes of existential quantification, one of which
holds the values of a variable fixed throughout a quantificational context while the
other allows them to vary. Inspired by Dynamic Plural Logic and Dependence Logic,
we propose Plural Predicate Logic as an extension of Predicate Logic to formalize
this difference. We suggest that temporal for-adverbials are sensitive to aspect
because of the way they manipulate quantificational contexts, and that analogous
manipulations occur with spatial for-adverbials, habituals, and the quantifier all.
Keywords: all, aspectual composition, dependence logic, dynamic plural logic, for-
adverbials, Plural Predicate Logic, quantification, quantization puzzle, team logic, telicity
1 Introduction
It has been known since Garey (1957) that the aspectual properties of a verb phrase
should be derived both from the nature of the verb and its arguments. Thus, when a
verb like eat combines with different objects, the result can be an atelic verb phrase
that is compatible with for-adverbials, as in (1a), or a telic verb phrase that is not, as
in (1b). This process is known as aspectual composition.
(1) a. John ate { apples / applesauce } for an hour.
b. *John ate { two apples / two cups of applesauce } for an hour.
Early theories of aspectual composition, like Verkuyl (1972), captured this process
via syntactic features that are passed on from the verb and the object to the verb
* We thank Fredrik Engström and Anna Szabolcsi for helpful discussion and comments.
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phrase. Dowty (1979) criticized such feature-based approaches as lacking explana-
tory power. In model-theoretic approaches, like Krifka (1989, 1998), telicity is rather
correlated with algebraic/mereological notions, and it is the semantic properties of
the verb and of the object that determine those of the verb phrase. In (1b), the object
noun phrase is quantized: no proper part of a sum of two apples, for example, is a
sum of two apples. Moreover, eat is an incremental-theme verb: the themes of the
subevents of any eating event e are proper parts of the theme of e. As a result, the
full verb phrase is also quantized—no subevent of any event of eating two apples is
itself an event of eating two apples—and so this verb phrase is incompatible with
for an hour. In contrast, the bare object noun phrases in (1a) are not quantized. For
example, a proper part of a sum of apples may well be a sum of apples; hence eat
apples is not quantized either—and so it is compatible with for an hour.
On this type of approach, a verb phrase built from an incremental-theme verb
and an object inherits the quantization properties of its object. The judgments in
(1) can then be explained by equating telicity with quantization and restricting the
domain of application of for-adverbials to non-quantized predicates, or to predicates
that meet some stronger condition, such as the subinterval property in Dowty (1979)
or stratified reference in Champollion (2017). However, many noun phrases that are
prima facie non-quantized can combine with incremental-theme verbs to form telic
predicates (Mittwoch 1982; Egg 1994; White 1994; Eberle 1998; Naumann 1999;
Zucchi & White 2001); this has come to be known as the “quantization puzzle”,
(Filip 2000).
(2) a. *John ate some apples for an hour.
b. *John ate less than three apples for an hour.
c. *John ate a quantity of apples for an hour.
These facts suggest that telicity has less to do with quantization per se than with a
more general distinction between noun phrases with overt determiners, like those in
(1b) and (2), and bare noun phrases, like those in (1a).
These two kinds of noun phrases also pattern differently in other kinds of
environments. First, there are similar co-occurrence patterns with spatial measure
adverbials and indefinite quantity adverbials:
(3) { Trees / *Some trees } grow for miles around this castle. (Moltmann 1991)
(4) He read { poetry / *something } a lot. (Mittwoch 1982)
Second, in sentences like (5), a habitual interpretation is preferred only with the bare
nominal that can pick out multiple articles:
(5) John wrote { copy / an article } for the Times. (Mittwoch 1982)
2
Rigid and Flexible Quantification in Plural Predicate Logic
Another related contrast crops up with all:
(6) a. All the guests are Canadians.
b. *All the guests are { some / five / several } Canadians.
Taken together, these observations suggest a difference between bare plurals and
bare mass nouns on the one hand, and other indefinite and cardinal noun phrases
on the other hand. The fact that a varied set of constructions distinguishes between
these two kinds of noun phrases and draws the line between them in the same place
motivates positing a semantic difference between the two kinds. The puzzle is how
to formally capture the contrast between the two kinds of noun phrases in a way that
explains how they affect the relevant properties of the verb phrase in different ways.
We will refer to bare plurals and mass terms as unspecified noun phrases and
to indefinite and cardinal noun phrases with overt determiners as specified noun
phrases. Pretheoretically, it is not clear what the semantic difference is between
these two kinds of noun phrases that can explain the above patterns. Krifka (1998:
§3.8) suggests, following Mittwoch (1982), that the difference between them is
scope-based: specified noun phrases must take wide scope over the verb phrase and
its modifiers, whereas unspecified noun phrases can take narrow scope. However,
Zucchi & White (2001: §5) argue convincingly against this kind of account because
when a distributive quantifier intervenes between a for-adverbial and a specified noun
phrase, that noun phrase can be interpreted in a way that suggests a narrow-scope
position. Thus, in (7a), one golf ball must have been hit and retrieved repeatedly, but
in (7b) it is also possible that each time a different ball was hit (Zucchi p.c. to van
Geenhoven 2005):
(7) a. Jim hit a golf ball into the lake for an hour.
b. Jim hit a golf ball into the lake every five minutes for an hour.
This suggests that the specified noun phrase a golf ball can take scope under the
distributive quantifier every five minutes as well as under the for-adverbial.
In fact, as shown in Champollion (2016a) and the literature cited there, covaria-
tion is even possible under certain circumstances when distributivity is contributed
by a contextually licensed covert operator. In a context where the daily intake of pills
by hospital patients is salient, the following example can be interpreted as involving
covariation of two pills with the for-adverbial:
(8) The patient took two pills for a month and then went back to one pill.
These kinds of facts make it difficult to maintain that the different behavior of the
relevant noun phrases is driven by scope. In this paper, we suggest instead that
specified and unspecified noun phrases are distinguished by what we call their rigid
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versus flexible quantificational profiles.1 The intuitive idea is the following. When
a variable is bound by a specified noun phrase, the values assigned to it are held
fixed, or rigidified, throughout a quantificational context; in (2), this causes a certain
quantity of apples to be held fixed throughout the subintervals introduced by for an
hour. In contrast, unspecified noun phrases involve flexible existential quantification
where the values assigned to a variable can fluctuate throughout a context. Building
on the verb semantics in Krifka (1998), we then offer a more refined explanation of
how the verb interacts with the object noun phrase to derive the aspectual properties
of the verb phrase. By formalizing the semantic difference between specified and
unspecified noun phrases in this way, we are able to avoid the quantization puzzle
because we do not tie the behavior of these noun phrases only to algebraic properties
such as quantization or stratified reference.
In Section 2, we formalize the rigid-flexible dichotomy by enriching Predicate
Logic with a notion of quantificational context that replaces assignment functions
by sets of assignment functions. In Section 3, we use this system to explain the
judgments in (1) and (2). Section 4 explains how distributivity operators such as
every five minutes can mask the rigidity requirements imposed by specified noun
phrases and how this allows for covariation to arise. In Section 5, we show how the
rigid-flexible dichotomy can also explain the contrasts in the related examples (3)
through (6); among other things, we suggest that all manipulates quantificational
contexts along the same lines as for-adverbials. After comparing our approach in
Section 6 to earlier work on the quantization puzzle by Zucchi & White (2001), we
conclude in Section 7.
2 Rigidity in Plural Predicate Logic
Inspired by Dynamic Plural Logic (DPlL, van den Berg 1996; Brasoveanu 2008,
2013; Henderson 2014) and by Dependence Logic and Team Logic (Väänänen 2007),
we propose Plural Predicate Logic (PPL) to formalize rigid and flexible existential
quantification. The essential difference between PPL and ordinary predicate logic
(PL) is that whereas formulae in PL are evaluated relative to single assignments,
PPL uses sets of assignments, which we refer to as quantificational contexts.
Because our examples involve distribution over time, we will work with first-
order models of the form M = 〈D,I〉 where the domain D = De ∪Dτ consists
of a subdomain De of individuals and a subdomain Dτ of time intervals, and I
1 The correspondence between rigidity and the presence of overt determiners is not one to one. For one
thing, languages such as French use determiners to express the meaning of English bare plurals and
bare mass terms. For another, the negative polarity item any cannot be treated as introducing rigid
quantification; otherwise, we would incorrectly predict that sentences like John didn’t eat any apples
for an hour are infelicitous. Thanks to Anna Szabolcsi for this observation.
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is a standard interpretation function where I(R) ⊆ Dn for any n-ary relation R.
We assume that De and Dτ are each subject to the axioms of classical extensional
mereology; that is, they are equipped with partial orders ≤e and ≤τ and sum
operations ⊕e and ⊕τ such that each ⊕i is the least upper bound of its ≤i (for
additional details, see Champollion & Krifka 2016). We assume that temporal
intervals may be discontinuous, and that ≤τ represents temporal inclusion. We do
not model other relations such as temporal precedence, but they could easily be
added to the system.
Variable assignments in PL are total functions g1,g2, . . . from the set of vari-
ables V to D. We work with quantificational contexts G,H, . . ., each of which is a
nonempty set of variable assignments. Consider for example the following set G,
consisting of three assignment functions g1, g2 and g3, where g1 assigns Ann to x
and Bill to y, g2 assigns Carlos to x and Ann to y, and g3 assigns Ann to x and Carlos
to y. This assignment is pictured in the following matrix:
(9)
G . . . x y . . .
g1 . . . Ann Bill . . .
g2 . . . Carlos Ann . . .
g3 . . . Ann Carlos . . .
In PL, variable assignments are manipulated as shown in (10):
(10) g[x]h := for any variable v, if v 6= x then g(v) = h(v)
(Assignments g and h differ at most with respect to the value assigned to x.)
In contrast, the manipulation of assignments in PPL is based on a relation between
sets of assignments, which we define as follows:
(11) G[x]H := ∀g ∈G∃h ∈H such that g[x]h and ∀h ∈H∃g ∈G such that g[x]h
For example, let G be as in (9) and let H be as in (12); then G[z]H holds:
(12)
H . . . x y z . . .
h1 . . . Ann Bill David . . .
h2 . . . Carlos Ann Eva . . .
h3 . . . Ann Carlos Flora . . .
h4 . . . Ann Carlos George . . .
In addition to (11), we define a rigidified notion of assignment manipulation in (13).
This notion is the backbone of our analysis. It requires every assignment in the
output context H to assign the same value to x.
(13) G[x!]H := G[x]H and h(x) = h′(x) for any h,h′ ∈ H
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For example, let G and H be as before; then G[z!]H does not hold because the
different assignment functions in (12) disagree on z. However, G[z!]H ′ holds for the
following context H ′:
(14)
H ′ . . . x y z . . .
h1 . . . Ann Bill David . . .
h2 . . . Carlos Ann David . . .
h3 . . . Ann Carlos David . . .
h4 . . . Ann Carlos David . . .
With this machinery in place, we can now lift the interpretation function I in
a model M to an interpretation function for all well-formed formulae in the lan-
guage that evaluates them for truth relative to models and quantificational contexts.
(One can then define truth at a model in terms of truth at this model and every
quantificational context: JϕKM = T iff for all G, JϕKGM = T .)
We first define the semantics of atomic formulae in (15). Such formulae are
interpreted pointwise on each assignment (for ease of exposition, we leave the
relativity to a model implicit):
(15) Interpretation of atomic formulae
a. JR(x1, ...xn)KG = T iff for all g ∈ G, 〈g(x1), ...g(xn)〉 ∈ I(R)
b. Jx1 = x2KG = T iff for all g ∈ G, g(x1) = g(x2)
Moving on to the sentential connectives, the interpretation of conjunction is straight-
forward:
(16) Interpretation of conjunction
a. Jϕ ∧ψKG = T iff JϕKG = T and JψKG = T
However, other connectives present us with some interesting choices (see Galliani
2017 for an overview). In dependence logic, team logic, and their variants, negation
can be defined in the following ways:
(17) Interpretation of negation
a. J¬ϕKG = T iff JϕKG = F
b. J∼ϕKG = T iff JϕKG′ = F for all G′ ⊆ G
In (15a), negation simply flips between truth and falsity at a quantificational context.
In (15b), however, the truth value of a negated formula ∼ϕ relative to context G
depends on whether the embedded sentence is false at G and all other subcontexts of
G.
Likewise, we can define disjunction in at least two ways. The second option is
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sometimes known as splitjunction in dependence logic (see also Hawke & Steinert-
Threlkeld 2016).
(18) Interpretation of disjunction
a. Jϕ ∨ψKG = T iff JϕKG = T or JψKG = T
b. Jϕ ⊗ψKG = T iff there exists two (possibly empty) sets G′ and G′′
such that G = G′∪G′′ and JϕKG′ = T and JψKG′′ = T
The availability of these alternative negations and disjunctions raises interesting
questions about which of these formal connectives are best suited for translating
ordinary language expressions involving negation and/or disjunction. But since we
focus in this paper on examples which do not involve negation or disjunction, we
do not pursue this further here (though we say a bit more about this issue in the
conclusion).
We assume that the object language has the means to talk about the cardinality
of individuals inDe. More specifically, an individual inDe is an atom just in case its
only mereological part is itself: atom(x) := ∀y≤e x [y = x]. We assume that every
individual in De is the sum of a set S⊆De of one or more atomic individuals. For
any x ∈De, we write |x| for the number of atoms that x consists of. Based on this,
we define domain-level cardinality predicates as follows:
(19) Domain-level cardinality
a. Jx = nKG = T iff for all g ∈ G, |g(x)|= n
b. Jx≤ nKG = T iff for all g ∈ G, |g(x)| ≤ n
c. Jx≥ nKG = T iff for all g ∈ G, |g(x)| ≥ n
Finally, we reach the crucial clauses for quantification. Building on the flexible and
rigid manipulation of assignments in (11) and (13), we define two types of existential
quantification: flexible existential quantification, as in (20a), and rigid existential
quantification, as in (20b).
(20) a. J∃flexx[ϕ](ψ)KG = T iff Jϕ ∧ψKH = T for some H such that G[x]H
b. J∃rigidx[ϕ](ψ)KG = T iff Jϕ ∧ψKH = T for some H such that G[x!]H
The contrast between these two forms of existential quantification is the key to our
solution to the quantization puzzle.
3 Solving the quantization puzzle: application to for-adverbials
As we have seen in Section 1, incremental-theme verbs combine with unspecified
noun phrases to form atelic verb phrases that are compatible with for-adverbials, and
with specified noun phrases to form telic verb phrases that are incompatible:
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(21) a. John ate apples for an hour.
b. *John ate two apples for an hour.
We analyze unspecified noun phrases as flexible existential quantifiers and specified
noun phrases as rigid existential quantifiers. Thus, the bare noun phrase apples and
the specified noun phrase two apples are translated as in (22). As is standard in the
literature on plural semantics (Link 1983), for any predicate (or relation) symbol P,
we write ∗P for its (pointwise) closure under mereological sum.
(22) a. [DP /0x apples](ϕ) ∃flexx[∗apple(x)](ϕ)
b. twox[apples](ϕ) ∃rigidx[∗apple(x)∧|x|= 2](ϕ)
We translate for an hour as follows:
(23) for an hourt,t
′
(ϕ) ∃rigidt[hour(t) = 1](∃flext ′[t ′ <τ t ∧ t ⊕= t ′](ϕ))
Here, the embedded indefinite an hour is translated as a rigid existential quantifier
that introduces an hour-long temporal interval t, keeping it constant across the
quantificational context. We assume that the for-adverbial also introduces a set of
proper subintervals t ′ of t that jointly cover t. Letting G(x) for the set {g(x) : g ∈G},
the “cover” relation, which is symmetric, is defined as follows:
(24) Jx ⊕=yKG = T iff⊕G(x) =⊕G(y)
Since the variable t ′ is bound flexibly, each assignment in the context is free to
map it to a different value. In effect, (23) unfurls the time interval introduced by
the indefinite an hour by spreading different subintervals of this interval across the
individual assignments in the quantificational context. The for-adverbial then passes
t ′ rather than t to the verb phrase ϕ . Since ordinary lexical predicates are evaluated
at each assignment in the context, these predicates will be required to hold at each of
the intervals over which t ′ ranges.2
We assume that (21a) is compositionally translated as follows:
(25) John ate apples for an hour 
∃rigidt[hours(t) = 1](∃flext ′[t ′ <τ t ∧ t ⊕= t ′](∃flexx[∗apple(x)](∗eat( j,x, t ′))))
The effect of this translation is that (21a) is true relative to a quantificational context
G just in case one can find a context H which is just like G except that (i) all of the
2 We could implement stronger notions of atelicity by changing the definition in (23). For example, we
could let t ′ range over all the subintervals of t if we wanted to represent atelicity via the subinterval
property; but this would run into the minimal-parts problem (Dowty 1979). The definition we use is
based on Piñón (2015) and Champollion (2015, 2017).
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assignments in H map t to the same hour-long interval, (ii) each assignment in H
maps t ′ to some proper subinterval of that interval, such that the various values of t ′
across H sum up to the value of t (since the subintervals are required to be proper,
the assignments cannot all map t ′ to the same subinterval), and (iii) each assignment
in H maps x to some potentially different apple or sum of apples that John eats at t ′.
Such a quantificational context H is exhibited here:
(26)
H . . . t t ′ x . . .
h1 . . . 9pm-10pm 9pm-9:10pm apple1 . . .
h2 . . . 9pm-10pm 9:10pm-9:40pm apple2⊕ apple3 . . .
h3 . . . 9pm-10pm 9:40pm-10pm apple4 . . .
We assume that the lexical semantics of eat specifies that nothing can be eaten more
than once; this can be ensured through meaning postulates on verbs as laid out in
Krifka (1998). Because of this constraint, the values of x must covary with the values
of t ′. The flexible existential quantifier introduced by the bare noun phrase apples
allows for this. For example, in the scenario shown in (26), John ate apple1 from
9pm to 9:10pm, apple2 and apple3 from 9:10pm to 9:40pm, and apple4 from 9:40pm
to 10pm.
Things are different in the case of (21b), where two apples introduces a rigid
existential quantifier:
(27) John ate two apples for an hour 
∃rigidt[hours(t) = 1](∃flext ′[t ′ <τ t ∧ t ⊕= t ′]
(∃rigidx[∗apple(x)∧|x|= 2](∗eat( j,x, t ′))))
The truth conditions of this formula differ from those of the previous one with
respect to the values that may be assigned to x. While the quantifier ∃flexx in (25)
allowed these values to vary from one assignment to the other, this time the quantifier
∃rigidx requires each assignment in the quantificational context to map x to the same
two-apple sum, as in this example:
(28)
H . . . t t ′ x . . .
h1 . . . 9pm-10pm 9pm-9:10pm apple1⊕ apple2 . . .
h2 . . . 9pm-10pm 9:10pm-9:40pm apple1⊕ apple2 . . .
h3 . . . 9pm-10pm 9:40pm-10pm apple1⊕ apple2 . . .
As before, the for-adverbial unfurls the hour-long interval 9pm-10pm into t ′. If the
value of x is held fixed across assignments, as shown in (28), the lexical semantics of
eat is bound to be violated. In order for (21b) to be true, John would, per impossible,
have to eat the same two apples repeatedly over the course of one hour.
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While we have relied on the same assumptions concerning verb semantics as the
analysis in Krifka (1998), our treatment of noun phrases is novel. What matters for us
is not whether the object noun phrase is quantized, but rather whether it contributes
rigid quantification, in the precise sense that we have laid out. This allows us to
extend our analysis of the specified and quantized noun phrase two apples to other
specified noun phrases such as some apples and less than three apples, even though
these noun phrases are not quantized (at least not in any straightforward sense). We
assume that indefinites like some apples are translated in the same way as two apples
in (22b) except that the cardinality check is different:
(29) somex [apples] (ϕ) ∃rigidx[∗apple(x)∧|x|> 1](ϕ)
The rigid quantifier will cause the values of x to be held constant across the quantifi-
cational context, which will violate the lexical semantics of eat when a for-adverbial
appears in the sentence, as in the previous example (27).
As for modified numerals like less/more than three apples, we assume with
Zucchi & White (2001) and Brasoveanu (2013: §2) that they introduce a maximal-
ization operator that provides access to all the apples that John ate. This is because a
sentence like John ate less than three apples is only true if the maximum number of
apples that John ate is less than three; it is not enough merely for there to be some
set of apples of cardinality less than three that John ate (after all, this might be a
proper subset of the apples he ate). This complication has nothing to do with the
quantization puzzle in itself; we include it only to get the right truth conditions.
We define maximalization based on the mereological proper-part relation <e
between individuals:
(30) Jσx(ϕ)(ψ)KG = T iff there is some H such that G[x!]H, JϕKH = T andJψKH = T, and there is no H ′ such that G[x!]H ′ and JϕKH ′ = T and h(x)<e
h′(x) for some h ∈ H and h′ ∈ H ′
This operator first picks a maximally large sum among the entities such that ϕ ,
then rigidly binds this sum to x, and finally checks whether ψ holds. Using this
operator, we translate the modified numeral less than three apples so as to introduce
the maximal number of apples that satisfy the nuclear scope of the quantifier and
then use a cardinality test to check that their number is less than three:
(31) less than threex[apples](ϕ) σx(∗apple(x)∧ϕ)(|x|< 3)
Because this maximalization operator involves rigid assignment manipulation, its
effect on for-adverbials is the same as that of the rigid quantifier in (22b).
To sum up, because indefinites and modified numerals introduce rigid quantifiers,
our system treats them analogously to unmodified numerals in that they do not allow
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the value of their variable to vary across a quantificational context, such as the ones
unfurled by for-adverbials. Therefore they cannot be used as the theme argument of
an incremental-theme verb embedded under a for-adverbial.
4 Adding distributivity
Our analysis not only offers a solution to the quantization puzzle, it can also naturally
account for the fact that specified noun phrases can covary in the scope of for-
adverbials when a temporal universal quantifier intervenes. We have seen an example
of this in (7); here is another one:
(32) John found a flea (on his dog) every day for a year.
As we have seen in Section 1, this kind of example is a challenge for scope-based
accounts such as the one proposed by Krifka (1998: §3.8), where specified noun
phrases must take wide scope over for-adverbials. On such accounts, it is hard to
explain why every day can prevent a flea from taking wide scope.
As in DPlL (Brasoveanu 2008; Henderson 2014), we assume that noun phrases
of the shape every N launch a separate quantificational context for each N. The
interpretation of such noun phrases consists of two steps: first, introduce all the
Ns and spread them out across the quantificational context via an assignment max-
imalization operator M, defined as in (33a); next, distribute over the values of N
via an assignment distributive operator D, defined as in (33b), which breaks up the
quantificational context according to the values of N (see also van den Berg 1996:
98). We write Gx=a for the set {g ∈ G : g(x) = a}.
(33) a. JMx[ϕ](ψ)KG = T iff Jϕ ∧ψKH = T for some H such that G[x]H and
there is no H ′ such that G[x]H ′ where JϕKH ′ = T and H(x)( H ′(x)
b. JDx(ϕ)KG = T iff JϕKGx=a = T for each a ∈ G(x)
We translate every day as follows:
(34) everyt
′′
t ′ [day](ϕ) Mt ′′[day(t ′′)∧ t ′∩ t ′′ 6= /0](Dt ′′(ϕ))
The domain restriction for this quantifier is provided by the time interval stored
under t ′; in (32), we assume that the value of this variable is supplied by the rigid
indefinite a year. Via M, the quantifier (34) then stores the set of all days of t ′ under
a new variable t ′′, and then distributes the nuclear scope ϕ over t ′′ via D.
We translate sentence (32) as follows:
(35) ∃rigidt[years(t) = 1](∃flext ′[t ′ <τ t ∧ t ⊕= t ′](Mt ′′[day(t ′′)∧ t ′′∩ t ′ 6= /0]
(Dt ′′(∃rigidx[∗flea(x)](∗find( j,x, t ′′))))))
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Effectively, (35) splits up a quantificational context into separate contexts, one for
each day, as illustrated here:
(36)
H t t ′ t ′′
h1 2016 Jan-Mar day1
h2 2016 Feb-May day2
... ... ... ...









In this example, the indefinite a year is rigid; therefore every assignment assigns
to variable t the same value, namely the year 2016. The for-adverbial then assigns
the variable t ′ a set of subintervals of that year that cover it. As in previous examples,
the division of t into these subintervals is arbitrary; for example, in (36), some of the
values of t ′ happen to overlap, but this is not essential. The quantifier every day takes
its domain restriction from t ′. It introduces a new variable t ′′, which holds all those
days that overlap with the values of t ′, that is, all the days of 2016. The distributive
operator Dt ′′ then splits the quantificational context into many separate contexts, one
for each day of 2016. As a consequence of this splitting of contexts, the quantifier a
flea is free to map its variable x to a different value in each of them even though it is
rigid. Since rigidity is checked only within each context, the values of x (the fleas)
are free to covary with the values of t ′′ (the days).
5 Application to constructions other than for-adverbials
We have seen how the distinction between rigid and flexible quantification helps
solve the quantization puzzle. However, we have not yet independently motivated
the claim that specified noun phrases are rigid while unspecified noun phrases are
flexible. To provide this motivation, in this section we show that this distinction
also explains the related observations in Section 1 involving spatial and indefinite
quantity adverbials, habitual readings, and all.
The analysis of spatial for-adverbials parallels that of temporal for-adverbials,
but the quantification is now over regions of space rather than temporal intervals.
Consider this slight variant of the earlier example (3) from Moltmann (1991):
(37) a. Trees grow for ten miles around this castle.
b. *Some trees grow for ten miles around this castle.
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To explain the contrast between (37a) and (37b), we now add a subdomain Dσ
of two-dimensional spatial regions to the domain of our models in addition to the
subdomains De and Dτ of individuals and temporal intervals (where Dσ is also
subject to classical mereology). Like for an hour, we analyze for ten miles around
this castle as first introducing a spatial region centered at the castle which radiates
outward for ten miles, and then unfurling this region into a cover of subregions that
are spread throughout a quantificational context:
(38) for ten miles around this castles,s
′
(ϕ) 
∃rigids[ten-miles-around-this-castle(s)](∃flexs′[s′ <σ s∧ s ⊕=s′](ϕ))
The unspecified noun phrase trees is a flexible quantifier, so we assume that sentence
(37a) is translated as follows:
(39) ∃rigids[ten-miles-around-this-castle(s)](∃flexs′[s′ <σ s∧ s ⊕=s′]
(∃flexx[∗tree(x)](∗grow(x,s′))))
This sentence effectively tests whether there is some way of assigning potentially
different trees (the values of x) to proper subregions of a space of ten miles around
the castle (the values of s′) such that the trees grow in the respective subregions—the
intuitive meaning of the sentence.
On the other hand, the specified noun phrase some trees contributes rigid quan-
tification, so (37b) is translated using ∃rigidx:
(40) ∃rigids[ten-miles-around-this-castle(s)](∃flexs′[s′ <σ s∧ s ⊕=s′]
(∃rigidx[∗tree(x)∧|x|> 1](∗grow(x,s′))))
Now the same sum of trees is passed on as an argument to grow throughout the
quantificational context. We assume that it is part of the lexical semantics of grow
that nothing can grow in two places at once, hence we have a violation. As in the
temporal case, felicity can be restored by intervening with a distributive operator:
(41) a. *Two sentinels are posted for ten miles around this castle.
b. Two sentinels are posted every 100 feet for ten miles around this castle.
By launching separate quantificational contexts for different spatial subregions, every
100 feet facilitates covariation.
It is perhaps unsurprising that spatial and temporal for-adverbials behave so
similarly. But, as we have suggested, the difference between rigid and flexible
quantifiers is also operative in examples like the following (Mittwoch 1982):
(42) He read { poetry / *something } a lot.
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(43) John wrote { copy / an article } for the Times.
We can account for these facts in an analogous fashion as before. Briefly, in (42),
a lot sets up a quantificational context where he read { poetry / something } must
hold at sufficiently many temporal intervals that are assigned to some variable in
the context. The flexible noun phrase poetry can introduce multiple poems while
the rigid noun phrase something must introduce a single individual that is held
constant throughout the context. This explains the contrast in judgments. Likewise,
in (43), the unspecified noun phrase copy can introduce multiple articles throughout
the context, and so allows for a habitual reading. But the specified noun phrase
an article can introduce only a single article. Assuming that the silent habitual
introduces its quantificational context, this would require that John wrote the exact
same article over and over again for the Times. This contradicts world knowledge,
hence the habitual reading is unavailable.
We leave it for future work to develop these proposals in more depth. Instead,
let us finally turn to all, which quantifies over individuals rather than temporal or
spatial intervals. We suggest that appealing to rigid and flexible quantification can
explain the following variant of the quantization puzzle:
(44) a. All the guests are Canadians.
b. *All the guests are several Canadians.
Our proposal is that all acts like a for-adverbial in introducing the plural referent
picked out by its restrictor and then unfurling the quantificational context such that
different subindividuals of this referent are assigned throughout the context and
passed on to the predicate in the nuclear scope. The literature on the semantics of all
is extensive and has covered many different aspects of its behavior, most of which
are unrelated to the difference between specified and unspecified noun phrases (e.g.
Dowty 1987; Winter 2001; Champollion 2017) . To avoid unnecessary complexity,
we do not show how to integrate our approach with existing proposals.
We assume the following entry for all:
(45) allx,x
′
[ϕ](ψ) σx(ϕ)(∃flexx′[x′ <e x∧ x′ ⊕=x](ψ))
This has the effect of instantiating x with the maximal sum of all the entities satisfying
its restrictor ϕ , then flexibly introducing a decomposition of this sum entity, and
finally evaluating its nuclear scope ψ . The parts of x are stored under x′ and have to
be proper parts of x that sum up to the value of x; this forces the values of x′ to vary
throughout the quantificational context that all introduces.
We can then translate (44a) and (44b) as follows:
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(46) a. σx(∗guest(x))(∃flexx′[x′ <e x∧ x ⊕=x′](∃flexy[∗Canadian(y)](x′ = y)))
b. σx(∗guest(x))(∃flexx′[x′ <e x∧ x ⊕=x′]
(∃rigidy[∗Canadian(y)∧|y|> 1](x′ = y)))
Aside from the cardinality check, these two formulae differ only in that the existential
quantifier over y is flexible in (46a) but rigid in (46b). This means that in the first
case, the values of y can vary across the quantificational context, while in the second
case the value of y is fixed throughout the context. We have translated the copula are
as requiring equality between x′ and y; since x′ has different values throughout the
context, y must be able to covary with x′. This is possible in (46a) but not in (46b),
which explains the contrast between (44a) and (44b).
To be sure, there are many puzzles concerning the word all that we have not
accounted for in this paper. In the conclusion, we suggest avenues for future research
on one of these puzzles.
6 Previous work: Zucchi & White (2001)
The central claim of our approach is that rigidity is a crucial factor that allows noun
phrases to lead to telicity even in the absence of quantization. We have assumed
essentially the same verb phrase semantics as Krifka (1998) (modulo the event
semantics). Zucchi & White (2001), by contrast, aim to hold on to the idea that
quantization is at stake in sentences like these:
(47) a. ??John drank a quantity of milk for an hour.
b. ??John found some fleas on his dog for an hour.
c. ??John found a twig for ten minutes.
(48) a. ??John wrote most of the letters for an hour.
b. ??John found most of the fleas for an hour.
c. ??John found less than half of the fleas for an hour.
To overcome the quantization puzzle, Zucchi & White explore two strategies, of
which the first accounts only for ordinary indefinites as in (47), and the second
accounts for both (47) and (48). They leave it open whether it is preferable to use
a mix of both strategies or only the second. Their first strategy treats indefinites as
predicates over free variables, as in Kamp (1981) and Heim (1982). These variables
can be existentially bound by a sentence-level closure operator, but not by for-
adverbials. Since existential closure takes scope above the for-adverbial, this is
similar to a scope account. But Zucchi & White also assume that the individual
variables of indefinites can be existentially bound by distributive quantifiers like every
day. This allows them to capture the covariation of indefinites with such quantifiers
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in examples like (7b) and (32). Their second strategy is based on retrieving the
maximal number of events of a certain kind within the reference time, following a
technique developed by Krifka (1992). For example, an event that can be described
as write most of the letters is a writing event whose theme is the sum of all the
letters written by John at the reference time tr, such that the cardinality of this sum
is greater than one half the number of the letters. This reference time variable tr can
be supplied at sentence level, or it can be bound by distributive quantifiers such as
every day.
Our own approach is similar to Zucchi & White (2001) in that we use maximiza-
tion in the interpretation of modified noun phrases. However, we do not assume that
every day can directly bind variables supplied by noun phrases. On our approach,
the individual variable of a noun phrase is bound by the rigid or flexible quantifier
that the noun phrase introduces. The assumption that every day binds the individual
variables of noun phrases in its scope strikes us as stipulative. As for the idea that
reference time variables are bound by every day, one problem is that as soon as
we try to analyze spatial counterparts of the phenomenon, such as the contrast in
(41), we need to add an additional spatial counterpart of that variable. No such
complication arises in our system because distributive quantifiers like every day and
every mile induce covariation via the quantificational contexts that they unfurl rather
than via variable binding.
7 Conclusion and outlook
We have proposed that noun phrases with overt determiners are distinguished from
bare noun phrases by what we have called their rigid versus flexible quantificational
profiles. Rigid noun phrases bind a variable and then hold its value fixed throughout
a quantificational context, while flexible noun phrases allow these values to vary
across the context. To formalize this distinction, we generalized Predicate Logic by
relativizing the interpretation function to quantificational contexts, understood as
sets of assignment functions. Our proposal was that related phenomena involving
temporal and spatial for-adverbials, habituals, and all, among other expressions, can
be explained in terms of the way in which these expressions rigidly impact such
quantificational contexts.
The formal logic we have defined, Plural Predicate Logic, is a close relative of
Dependence Logic and Team Logic (Väänänen 2007) and of Independent Plural
Logic (van den Berg 1996). The precise relationship between these logics depends
on how we define negation and disjunction, a question we have left open here. At
first sight, the version of negation in (17b) seems more adequate than the version
in (17a), given that a sentence like For an hour, John didn’t dance is true only if
there is an hour such that John didn’t dance at any of its subintervals. In the case of
16
Rigid and Flexible Quantification in Plural Predicate Logic
disjunction, judgments are less clear: the choice between (18a) and (18b) depends
on whether sentence (49) has a reading that is compatible with John carrying out
both activities in alternation over the course of one hour.
(49) For an hour, John sang or danced.
The entry in (18b) predicts that this reading should be available out of the blue, while
the entry in (18a) predicts that sentence (49) can only mean Either John sang for
an hour or he danced for an hour, at least in the absence of temporal distributivity
operators (Champollion 2016a).
As we have seen, the distinction between rigid and flexible existential quan-
tification allows us to deal with “quantization puzzle”-like phenomena beyond
for-adverbials, such as the contrast involving all in (44). There are many puzzles left
with “all” that we have not accounted for in this paper. For example, the contrast
between Canadians and several Canadians in (44) is reminiscent of the following
minimal pair discussed by Zweig (2009):
(50) a. All the linguistics majors dated chemistry majors.
b. All the linguistics majors dated several chemistry majors.
Zweig observes that unlike (50a), (50b) entails that each linguistics major dated
several chemistry majors. A full account of the semantics of these sentences requires
a more sophisticated treatment of all than the one we have given in (45) and is beyond
the scope of this paper; for discussion, see Dowty (1987: 10) and Champollion
(2016b, 2017). The distinction between rigid and flexible quantifiers may well play
a role in the explanation of this type of difference.
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